tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-40236037419071795202023-11-15T10:28:57.061-05:00Cleveland Employment Law BlogDavid W. Neel - Cleveland Employment Attorneyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07231905872240364058noreply@blogger.comBlogger75125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4023603741907179520.post-76449047988364344202019-05-03T11:18:00.000-04:002019-05-03T11:18:10.702-04:00Admissibility of Co-Worker Statements in Employment CasesFor a simple explanation about using co-worker statements in the employment law setting, see my <a href="https://neellaw.com/2019/04/admissibility-of-co-worker-statements-in-employment-cases/" target="_blank">article</a> at <a href="http://neellaw.com/">neellaw.com</a>.David W. Neel - Cleveland Employment Attorneyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07231905872240364058noreply@blogger.com1Cleveland, OH, USA41.49932 -81.69436050000001641.309034 -82.017084000000011 41.689606 -81.371637000000021tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4023603741907179520.post-80430225581673316792019-05-03T11:08:00.002-04:002019-05-03T11:13:01.542-04:00Prior Consistent Statements in Employment Cases<div style="text-align: left;">
For a simple explanation about using prior consistent statements in the employment law setting, see my <a href="https://neellaw.com/2019/04/prior-consistent-statements-in-employment-cases/" target="_blank">article </a>at <a href="http://neellaw.com/">neellaw.com</a>.</div>
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David W. Neel - Cleveland Employment Attorneyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07231905872240364058noreply@blogger.com0Cleveland, OH, USA41.49932 -81.69436050000001641.309034 -82.017084000000011 41.689606 -81.371637000000021tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4023603741907179520.post-42986388234047068102016-11-22T08:10:00.000-05:002019-03-28T14:26:46.783-04:00The Future of President Obama's Overtime Pay ReformsInteresting <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/obama-expanded-overtime-pay-for-millions-of-workers-trump-could-take-it-away_us_58334ba0e4b058ce7aac5ee5" target="_blank">article</a> regarding what President-Elect Trump might do to gut President Obama's overtime pay reform efforts.David W. Neel - Cleveland Employment Attorneyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07231905872240364058noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4023603741907179520.post-31266904061674173702016-08-24T15:45:00.000-04:002016-08-24T15:45:34.905-04:00Ohio Makes It Easier To Obtain Public Records<div style="text-align: justify;">
The <a href="http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2016/08/23/ohioans-will-have-a-new-alternative-when-trying-to-get-public-records.html" target="_blank">Columbus Dispatch</a> reports that the Ohio General Assembly has passed legislation intended to streamline fights with government over public record requests. The law applies to all levels and types of government in Ohio. The article reports:</div>
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"On Sept. 28, the Ohio Court of Claims will begin accepting complaints on the refusal to release
records by government at all levels, from townships to the state. The law *** will send
complaints to a mediator who will work with citizens and government officials in an attempt to
reach a resolution. If no agreement is reached, a special master will rule within seven days whether government was
legally correct in denying a records request or broke the law and must hand over the records. *** The appeals process requires but a complaint form, a $25 filing fee and accompanying copies of
the records requests and government denials."</div>
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Public record requests area great way to gather information before suing a governmental entity. This new law should help make it easier to obtain such information.</div>
David W. Neel - Cleveland Employment Attorneyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07231905872240364058noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4023603741907179520.post-88008681543797298152016-08-23T12:19:00.001-04:002016-08-23T12:19:59.506-04:00Employer's Religious Rights Win Out Over Transgendering Employee's RIghts<!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
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<![endif]-->Anthony Stephens began working as a Funeral director for R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes in 2007. Six years later Stephens gave the funeral home a letter stating:<br /><br />"Dear Friends and Co-Workers:<br /><br />"What I must tell you is very difficult for me and is taking all the courage I can muster. I am writing this both to inform you of a significant change in my life and to ask for your patience, understanding, and support, which I would treasure greatly. . ..I have a gender identity disorder that I have struggled with my entire life. I have managed to hide it very well all these years . . ..<br /><br />"I have been in therapy for nearly four years now and have been diagnosed as a transsexual. I have decided to become the person that my mind already is. Toward that end, I intend to have sex reassignment surgery. The first step I must take is to live and work full-time as a woman for one year. At the end of my vacation on August 26, 2013, I will return to work as my true self, Amiee Australia Stephens, in appropriate business attire. . .. It is my wish that I can continue my work at R.G. & G. R. Harris Funeral Homes doing what I have always done, which is my best!"</div>
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There was no question that Stephens intended to abide by the funeral home’s dress code for female funeral directors. After receiving the letter the business owner, Thomas Rost, decided to fire Stephens. There was no dispute that Rost based his decision on sincerely held religious beliefs.<br /><br />The legal issue was whether the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) trumped Stephens’ rights under Title VII, the federal anti-discrimination in employment law. Title VII prohibits employers from discharging or otherwise discriminating against any individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment “because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that sex discrimination may manifest itself in stereotypical notions as to how women and men should dress and present themselves in the workplace. It’s referred to as sex-stereotyping. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). The goal of the sex-stereotyping theory of sex discrimination is that “gender” “be irrelevant” with respect to the terms and conditions of employment and to employment decisions. <i>Id.</i><br /><br />The funeral home based its RFRA defense on the Supreme Court’s decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751 (2014). The majority in Hobby Lobby held:<br /><br />“[L]aws [that are] ‘neutral’ toward religion,” Congress found, “may burden religious exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere with religious exercise.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(2); see also § 2000bb(a)(4). In order to ensure broad protection for religious liberty, RFRA provides that “Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability.” § 2000bb–1(a). If the Government substantially burdens a person’s exercise of religion, under the Act that person is entitled to an exemption from the rule unless the Government “demonstrates that application of the burden to the person—(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” § 2000bb–1(b)." <i>Id.</i> at 2761.<br /><br />The district court applied the following analysis: (1) whether the law at issue substantially burdens the Funeral Home’s exercise of religion (Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct. at 2775); (2) if so, whether the Government can meet its burden of showing that application of the burden “to the person is (a) in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (b) the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. <i>Hobby Lobby</i>, 134 S.Ct. at 2761.<br /><br />Finding that Title VII substantially burdened the funeral home’s exercise of religion The court next assumed that the EEOC met its first burden of showing the anti-discrimination provisions in Title VII furthered a compelling governmental interest and, therefore, proceeded to the least restrictive means burden analysis. The court decided that the EEOC failed to satisfy this burden. The court’s analysis seems to hinge on a question it asked: “[C]ouldn’t the EEOC propose a gender-neutral dress code (dark-colored suit, consisting of a matching business jacket and pants, but without a neck tie) as a reasonable accommodation that would be a less restrictive means of furthering that goal under the facts presented here?” The funeral home’s owner, Mr. Rost, had testified in deposition that female funeral director’s could acceptably wear a business pants suit. Stephens agreed. To the court the issue was whether Stephens had a right to comply with the funeral home’s dress code (skirt and matching jacket) and decided she did not if she could be accommodated by being allowed to wear a business pants suit -- less restrictive means of enforcing Title VII.<br /><br />Consequently, the court held that the funeral home was entitled to an RFRA exemption from Title VII. The EEOC has thirty days to appeal the decision to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. Given its straightforward and undisputed facts, this is an excellent case for the Supreme Court to revisit its decision in Hobby Lobby in order to provide guidance on what is a re-occurring issue. <br /><br /> The case is <a href="http://www.theemployerhandbook.com/files/2016/08/EEOC-v.-RGGR.pdf" target="_blank">EEOC v. RG & GR Harris Funeral Home, Inc. (E.D. Mich., Aug. 19, 2016)</a>.<br /><br /><span style="font-size: 12.0pt;"></span></div>
David W. Neel - Cleveland Employment Attorneyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07231905872240364058noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4023603741907179520.post-71175569423311792882016-08-08T12:49:00.003-04:002016-08-08T12:49:39.354-04:00Court Decides LGBT Discrimination is Lawful<span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt;">Kimberly Hively sued Ivy Tech Community College claiming she was not promoted because of her sexual orientation.
She based her claim on </span><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt;">Title VII of </span><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt;">the 1964 Civil Rights Act, arguing that employment discrimination against lesbians should be prohibited under Title VII. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt;">Hively of course is correct -- such discrimination should be unlawful. Title VII, however, is limited to discrimination based on race, color, national origin, sex or religion. </span><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt;">Predictably the federal Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decided that Hively's claim went "beyond the scope" of the statute. If Title VII is to apply to the LGBT community only Congress or the Supreme Court can make it happen.</span>
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<br /></div>
<span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt;">Discrimination against gays, lesbians and others with different sexual make-ups should be illegal -- Hively was right about that. This won't happen without legislative action. Sad but true. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt;">The case is <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/15-1720/15-1720-2016-08-03.html" target="_blank"><u>Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College</u></a>, </span><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt;"><span class="st">No. 15-1720 (7th Cir. 2016).</span> </span>David W. Neel - Cleveland Employment Attorneyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07231905872240364058noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4023603741907179520.post-3379261374397329632016-07-27T10:11:00.003-04:002016-07-27T10:11:45.740-04:00Police Shooting of a Non-Threatening Suspect Following A Car Chase Gives Rise to Viable Civil RIghts CaseSuing the police is a difficult endeavor because the qualified immunity doctrine shields government officials from liability for their exercise of discretion, unless their actions violate clearly established rights. Most civil rights cases against police officers fail for this reason. Moreover, after a trial court decides the qualified immunity question the case is immediately appealable. This means that years can go by before the plaintiff can even begin to engage in discovery on the merits, much less get a trial.<br />
<br />
Sometimes though the evidence demonstrates a clear case under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, the applicable civil rights statute. For example, police officers who fire rounds into a suspect's vehicle when the chase ends but who have no reason to believe they are threatened are not going to be entitled to qualified immunity. That's what happened in <a href="http://cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/14-5711/14-5711-2016-07-26.pdf?ts=1469563253" target="_blank"><u>Thompson v. City of Lebanon</u>, Case No. 14-5711 (6th Cir., July 26, 2016)</a>. The police in that case killed the suspect.<br />
<br />
Thompson's case merely survived a qualified immunity challenge. It took more than <i>six years</i> from the date of the incident to get a ruling from the court of appeals. The case now goes back to the trial court for further proceedings, assuming the defendants do not ask the U.S. Supreme Court to intervene. Justice delayed is justice denied. This case is prime example.David W. Neel - Cleveland Employment Attorneyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07231905872240364058noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4023603741907179520.post-20324394148372473672016-07-22T12:26:00.000-04:002016-07-22T12:26:46.771-04:00Workers' Compensation Retaliation Claim Does Not Require Proof Of A Workplace InjuryFollowing his termination Michael Onderko sued his former employer, Sierra Lobo, Inc. for workers' compensation retaliatory discharge under Ohio Revised Code 4123.90. The employer argued that Onderko's injury did not happen at work and that it terminated him for his
“deceptive” attempt to obtain workers’ compensation benefits. The trial court threw out the claim because Onderko failed to
prove his injury occurred at work. The Ohio Supreme Court upheld the court of appeals' reversal. The law in Ohio is now clear that retaliatory discharge under section 4123.90 does not require a showing
that the plaintiff suffered a workplace injury. The court further held that a failure to
appeal the denial of a workers’ compensation claim does not preclude a retaliatory discharge
claim under section 4123.90.<br />
<br />
The decision makes sense. The gravamen of a workers' compensation retaliatory discharge claim is retribution for the filing of a claim. The employee's entitlement to workers' compensation benefits is irrelevant. What matters is the employer's motivation for the discharge. Thus, the employer who decides to terminate an employee because of a workers' compensation filing is liable under section 4123.90, regardless of the employee's entitlement to benefits under the workers' compensation system.<br />
<br />
You can read the Ohio Supreme Court's decision here: <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2016/2014-1881.html" target="_blank">Onderko v. Sierra Lobo, Inc., 2016-Ohio-5027 (July 21, 2016).</a>David W. Neel - Cleveland Employment Attorneyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07231905872240364058noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4023603741907179520.post-20172347052217133992016-05-19T13:59:00.000-04:002016-05-19T13:59:04.091-04:00From the Ohio State Bar Association:<br />
<br />
Overtime pay is changing: What Is Changing<br />
<br />
The U.S. Department of Labor has posted its final overtime rule. The Final Rule updates the salary and compensation levels needed for Executive, Administrative and Professional workers to be exempt, in particular it:<br />
<br />
Sets the standard salary level at the 40th percentile of earnings of full-time salaried workers in the lowest-wage Census Region, currently the South ($913 per week; $47,476 annually for a full-year worker); and<br />
Sets the total annual compensation requirement for highly compensated employees (HCE) subject to a minimal duties test to the annual equivalent of the 90th percentile of full-time salaried workers nationally ($134,004)<br />
Automatic Updates and Salary Basis Test<br />
<br />
Establishes a mechanism for automatically updating the salary and compensation levels every three years to maintain the levels at the above percentiles and to ensure that they continue to provide useful and effective tests for exemption.<br />
Additionally, the Final Rule amends the salary basis test to allow employers to use nondiscretionary bonuses and incentive payments (including commissions) to satisfy up to 10 percent of the new standard salary level.<br />
Effective Date<br />
<br />
The new rule takes effect Dec. 1, 2016. The initial increases to the standard salary level (from $455 to $913 per week) and HCE total annual compensation requirement (from $100,000 to $134,004 per year) will be effective on that date. Future automatic updates to those thresholds will occur every three years, beginning on January 1, 2020.David W. Neel - Cleveland Employment Attorneyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07231905872240364058noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4023603741907179520.post-24631776706289346402016-04-30T10:07:00.000-04:002016-04-30T10:07:06.345-04:00Republicans Discriminate Against LGBT AmericansOn July 21, 2014 President Obama signed an <a href="http://big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/LGBTEO.pdf" target="_blank">Executive Order</a> prohibiting discrimination against Americans working for companies doing business with the federal government based on sexual orientation and gender identity. What a common sense decision. Why should employers be permitted to fire a fellow American because they are gay or because of their gender identity? There is no excuse for employment discrimination, period. Sure, employers should be permitted to "discriminate" between employees based on work quality or production, but because of who they are? Please.<br />
<br />
Leave it to our current Republican Congress to authorize discrimination against people because of their sexual orientation and identity. On April 29, 2016, the Republican-controlled House Armed Services Committee <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/gop-lgbt-executive-order_us_5723acd7e4b01a5ebde596da" target="_blank">voted </a>to allow such discrimination. Why stop there? Why not not approve discrimination based on religion, color or any other trait?<br />
<br />
We don't need bigots in Congress. Vote a straight (no pun intended) Democratic ticket in November.<br />
<br />
<br />David W. Neel - Cleveland Employment Attorneyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07231905872240364058noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4023603741907179520.post-64713254108671229382016-01-31T11:14:00.000-05:002016-08-23T12:22:57.027-04:00Sixth Circuit Decides Hybrid § 301 Fair Representation ClaimChillicothe Telephone Company terminated repair technician Jason Blesedell from his job of sixteen years for falsifying a timecard and impersonating a customer in telephone calls to the company. Blesedell had reported working on buried cables for four hours in the afternoon when work orders did not exist for that work and his GPS showed he had gone home early. The company met with Blesedell and his union representative to discuss the discrepancy. Following the meeting Blesedell called in and asked a dispatcher to change a work ticket to correspond to the story he had given the company at the meeting. The company believed that Blesedell made additional calls posing as a customer in order to manufacture evidence to address the company’s suspicions. Following his termination Blesedell filed a grievance but the union decided not to pursue arbitration, primarily because Blesedell’s version of events was not credible and conflicted with the evidence.<br />
<br />
Blesedell filed a hybrid § 301/fair-representation claim, alleging the company breached the collective bargaining agreement in violation of § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, by discharging Blesedell without just cause, and that the union did not fairly represent Blesedell in the grievance process.<br />
<br />
This case is a prototypical hybrid § 301 case. Hybrid claims require proof of both breach of the union’s duty of fair representation and breach of the collective bargaining agreement by the employer. Employees may prove breach of the union’s duty by showing that the union’s actions or omissions during the grievance process were arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. Arbitrariness, discrimination, and bad faith each provides a separate route by which a plaintiff may prove breach. In addition to proving arbitrary, discriminatory, or bad-faith conduct, a hybrid-claim plaintiff must prove that a union’s actions or omissions “more than likely affected” the outcome of the grievance procedure. Because a hybrid claim requires proof of both breach of the union’s duty and breach of the collective bargaining agreement by the employer, the entire claim fails absent a finding that the union breached its duty of fair representation. <br />
<br />
A union acts arbitrarily only if its conduct “is so far outside a wide range of reasonableness as to be irrational.” Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 67 (1991). The duty of fair representation requires a union to undertake a reasonable investigation to defend a union member, not an error-free one. Here, the union investigated the facts surrounding the grounds for termination and found that the termination would not be overturned through arbitration. Moreover, the court found, none of the union’s alleged failures in the investigation would have affected the outcome of Blesedell’s grievance.<br />
<br />
The moral of the story for employees is simple – do your job every day and don’t lie to your employer.<br />
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David W. Neel - Cleveland Employment Attorneyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07231905872240364058noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4023603741907179520.post-62712442649248884792015-11-02T09:53:00.000-05:002015-11-02T09:53:54.524-05:00"Ban the Box" to Become the Law for Federal EmployersLater today in Newark, New Jersey President Obama will announce an Executive Order prohibiting questions about criminal history on federal job applications. The announcement comes after years of nationwide lobbying by the "ban the box" movement. The Executive Order is geared toward giving people convicted of crimes a chance to land a job.<br />
<br />
It's no secret that most employers reject job applicants who reveal a criminal history on a job application. Prohibiting criminal history questions on an application will at least keep people in the running for a job. Employers will still be permitted to run background checks. There are no laws forbidding employers to base hiring decisions on background checks, so the ban the box order may not result in more employment for people with a crime on their record. It will, however, increase their employment opportunities. It remains up to the individual to demonstrate that despite their history they have experience and skills that make them the most qualified applicant.<br />
<br />
To help convicts get a job the State of Ohio created Certificates of Qualification for Employment ("CQE"). Ohio employers who hire a CQE holder are protected from lawsuits arising from conduct by the holder. Getting sued is often a reason why many employers do not want to hire people with a criminal history. <a href="https://www.ohiobar.org/ForPublic/Resources/LawYouCanUse/Pages/Certificate-Removes-Barriers-for-Job-Seekers-with-Criminal-Records.aspx" target="_blank">Read more about the process of obtaining a CQE here</a>.David W. Neel - Cleveland Employment Attorneyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07231905872240364058noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4023603741907179520.post-44660207969588570282015-11-01T12:43:00.000-05:002015-11-01T12:56:12.577-05:00FMLA, No-Fault Attendance Policies and the Statute of Limitations<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt;">
A recent case out
of the federal Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals shows the danger of waiting to
assert FMLA time-off rights. In <u><a href="http://cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/13-2833/13-2833-2015-10-20.pdf?ts=1445358643" target="_blank">Barrett v. Ill. Dep't of Corrs.</a></u>,
unreported, Case No. 13-2833 (7th Cir., Oct. 20, 2015), plaintiff's employer
had a no-fault attendance policy allowing 12 absences before termination. The
plaintiff missed work one time each in 2003, 2004 and 2005 for FMLA-covered
absences but did not assert her FMLA rights. The employer counted those
absences against her under the attendance policy. Plaintiff's twelfth absence
occurred in 2010 and resulted in her termination. Plaintiff waited seventeen
months before filing suit in 2012.<br />
<br />
Plaintiff
argued that the FMLA violation occurred upon her termination. The employer
countered that the alleged FMLA violations occurred in 2003-2005 and,
therefore, Plaintiff’s FMLA claim had to be filed within two years thereafter.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals agreed with the employer. The Court of Appeals reasoned as follows:<br />
<br />
We begin with the
statutory text. The FMLA provides that “an action may be brought under this
section not later than 2 years after the date of the last event constituting
the alleged violation for which the action is brought.” *** To determine
when the claim accrued, the statute tells us to identify the “last event”
constituting the alleged FMLA violation.<br />
<br />
Without going into
the full analysis, it’s pretty clear that the event giving rise to what was an
FMLA interference claim was counting an FMLA-covered event as an unexcused
absence under the attendance policy. Consequently, the FMLA-claim accrued at the
latest in 2005. Plaintiff had until 2007 to bring the claim but waited until
2012 to file a lawsuit. Too late.<br />
<br />
The moral of the
story is that employees should not sit on their rights. Contact an employment
lawyer (i.e., me) as soon as you’ve been nailed with an unexcused for
medically-related reasons. I have had great success with FMLA/attendance policy
cases, but no lawyer will be able to help you if you sit on your rights.<br />
<br />
Visit me at <a href="http://neellaw.com/">NeelLaw.com</a></div>
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You can contact me via email through <a href="http://www.neellaw.com/contact.html" target="_blank">NeelLaw.com</a> </div>
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David W. Neel - Cleveland Employment Attorneyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07231905872240364058noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4023603741907179520.post-56523732191458753502015-10-30T13:13:00.000-04:002015-10-30T13:13:22.976-04:00Halloween, Wicca and Religious Discrimination<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;">
To most Americans October 31<sup>st</sup> is Halloween. To
members of the Wicca religion October 31<sup>st</sup> is one of the most, if
not the most, important “sabbats” (solar festivals) of the year. I know this
because I was recently asked by a member of the faith whether her employer was
legally obligated to give her the day off for religious observance on October
31<sup>st</sup>. I had to do a little
research into the subject and what I learned is good news for witches and
warlocks. </div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;">
Federal courts are in agreement that Wicca is a religion protected
under federal law just as mainstream religions are. This from <u>Saeemodarae v. Mercy Health
Services-Iowa Corp.</u>, 456 F. Supp.2d 1021 (N.D. Iowa 2006):</div>
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<br /></div>
<div align="left" class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 0.5in;">
Federal
courts have recognized Wicca (also known under various names, including “the
Wiccan (or Wiccian) religion,” “the Craft,” “witchcraft,” or “the Old
Religion”) as a bona fide, established, or sincerely held religion that is
protected, for example, by the Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment to
the United States Constitution or Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
See, e.g., <u>Dettmer v. Landon</u>, 799 F.2d 929, 931-32 (4th Cir. 1986)
(Wicca is a religion protected by the Free Exercise clause of the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution); <u>Van Koten v. Family Health
Mgmt., Inc.</u>, 955 F. Supp. 898, 902 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (finding that Wicca was
a “religion” within the meaning of Title VII), aff’d, 134 F.3d 375 (7th Cir.
1998) (table op.) (finding sufficient evidence to assume a prima facie case,
including that the plaintiff was asserting protection on the basis of a
“religion” within the meaning of Title VII).</div>
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<br /></div>
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See also <u>Hedum v.
Starbucks Corp.</u>, 546 F. Supp.2d 1017, 1023 (D. Or. 2008) (“There is no
dispute that Ms. Hedum's practice of the Wiccan religion places her in a
protected class”).</div>
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<br /></div>
What does this mean for employees who request a day off from work for religious
observance on October 31st? Thus,
the employer who allows a Catholic employee a schedule change to attend services on Good Friday must
treat members of the Wicca faith in the same manner on their important holidays,
otherwise the employer is discriminating based on religion.David W. Neel - Cleveland Employment Attorneyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07231905872240364058noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4023603741907179520.post-53535032757077524212015-10-30T05:17:00.000-04:002015-10-30T05:17:23.543-04:00The Objective Test for Severe or Pervasive Sex Harassment<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Dana Ellis worked for Jungle Jim’s grocery. Upon transfer to the seafood department her new supervisor, Caldas, started making lewd comments and suggestions on what she said was a daily basis. Ellis cried and became physically ill because of her supervisor’s conduct. She needed her job, which paid $9.00 an hour. The store had a sex harassment policy in its employee handbook but Ellis didn’t follow it by complaining to her supervisor’s boss. A co-worker brought the harassment to the attention of management. The company reprimanded Caldas and told him to stop but the conduct continued albeit in a less direct way.<br />
<br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The law is clear as to what plaintiff’s such as Ellis must prove to win a hostile work environment sex harassment case:<br />
<br />
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Ellis
must demonstrate: that the harassment was unwelcome, (2) that the harassment
was based on sex, (3) that the harassing conduct was sufficiently severe or
pervasive to affect the "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
or any matter directly or indirectly related to employment," and (4) that
either (a) the harassment was committed by a supervisor, or (b) the employer,
through its agents or supervisory personnel, knew or should have known of the
harassment and failed to take immediate and appropriate corrective action.</div>
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<br /></div>
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The third element requires a two-pronged showing: the conduct in question must (1) be severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment, and (2) be subjectively perceived by the victim to be abusive.<br />
<br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>When you read <a href="http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/12/2015/2015-Ohio-4226.pdf" target="_blank">the opinion</a> it seems abundantly clear that the supervisor created an abusive sexually charged work environment. Nevertheless, the trial court tossed the case on summary judgment because it decided that the supervisor’s conduct wasn’t bad enough to make it harder for Ellis to do her job. The court of appeals reversed that decision and sent the case back for trial. The trial court’s error was in making its own subjective determination that a reasonable person would have been able to put up with the supervisor’s behavior. This is what I believe is a common mistake judge’s make. The issue for the trial court is not the judge’s opinion of the plaintiff’s working condition; rather, the issue is whether reasonable people, sitting on a jury, could view the evidence as demonstrating the existence of a hostile work environment. It’s unfortunate that Ms. Ellis had to pursue a timely and costly appeal in order to correct what really is a simple application of the law.<br />
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David W. Neel - Cleveland Employment Attorneyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07231905872240364058noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4023603741907179520.post-79524405254667378912015-10-03T09:35:00.000-04:002015-10-03T09:37:21.011-04:00Treatment of Direct Evidence in Age Discrimination Cases Under the ADEA<div style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in; text-align: justify;">
The federal Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals recently opined
on how direct evidence of age discrimination under the ADEA is to be addressed
on summary judgment. In <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/13-1558/13-1558-2014-09-02.html" target="_blank">Scheick v. Tecumseh Public Schools</a>, Case No. 13-1558 (6th
Cir., Sept. 2, 2015), the district court granted summary judgment in favor of
the employer Plaintiff’s evidence consisted, among other things, of statements
that “[t]he Board wants you to retire” and that the employer "wanted someone
younger.” The district court granted summary judgment, finding these statements
not direct evidence of age discrimination.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt;">
<br /></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt;">
The Sixth Circuit reversed based on the second set of
statements, explaining as follows:<o:p></o:p></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: .5in; text-align: justify;">
To prevail on a claim under the ADEA, it is not
sufficient for the plaintiff to show that age was a motivating factor in the
adverse action; rather, the ADEA’s “because of” language requires that a
plaintiff “prove by a preponderance of the evidence (which may be direct or
circumstantial) that age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the challenged employer
decision.” <i>Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc.</i>,
557 U.S. 167, 177-78 (2009) (citing <i>Reeves
v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods, Inc.</i>, 530 U.S. 133, 141-43, 147 (2000)). ***
[A]fter <i>Gross</i>, we now look to whether
evidence, if believed, requires the conclusion that age was the “but for” cause
of the employment decision.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: .5in; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 0.5in; text-align: center;">
* * *<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: .5in; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: .5in; text-align: justify;">
The first statement, made during the performance
review, did not constitute direct evidence of age discrimination. As the
district court found, McAran’s statement that the Board wanted Scheick to
retire would require an inference to conclude that retirement was a proxy for
age (as opposed to either years of service or a desire that he leave the
position voluntarily). See, e.g., <i>Scott
v. Potter</i>, 182 F. App’x 521, 526 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding the statement
“[w]hy don’t you retire and make everybody happy” did not constitute direct
evidence of age discrimination).<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: .5in; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: .5in; text-align: justify;">
In contrast, McAran’s other two statements about
wanting “someone younger” are not ambiguous and, if believed, do not require an
inference to conclude that age was the but-for cause of the decision not to
renew Scheick’s contract. First, the statements by McAran to Scheick on
February 26 and March 15, respectively, represent direct references to age. See
<i>Sharp v. Aker Plant Servs. Grp., Inc.</i>,
726 F.3d 789, 794 (6th Cir. 2013) (involving statement “we want someone
younger”). Moreover, the statements are not ambiguous despite the lack of an
explicit statement that “the Board” wanted someone younger. Cf. <i>Fuhr</i>, 710 F.3d at 674 (finding
ambiguities required inferences about what part of the “old boys network” took
which unspecified retaliatory actions). <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: .5in; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
The
Sixth Circuit, however, rejected the notion that presentation of direct
evidence will always defeat an employer’s motion for summary judgment under the
ADEA. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: .5in; text-align: justify;">
Thus, even when direct evidence of age discrimination
has been offered, the question to be asked in deciding an employer’s motion for
summary judgment is whether the evidence, taken as a whole and in the light
most favorable to plaintiff, is sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact
to conclude “that age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the challenged employer
decision.” <i>Gross</i>, 557 U.S. at 178.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: .5in; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: .5in; text-align: justify;">
</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
The
Court ultimately concluded that “the evidence, taken as a whole and in the
light most favorable to Scheick, is sufficient to permit a reasonable juror to
conclude that Scheick’s age was the but-for cause of TPS’s decision not to
renew the contract for his services.”<span style="font-size: 12pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: .5in; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
David W. Neel - Cleveland Employment Attorneyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07231905872240364058noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4023603741907179520.post-90840159258175608252015-09-29T12:12:00.000-04:002015-09-29T12:12:00.490-04:002016 Ohio Minimum Wage Same As 2015Ohio’s minimum wage of $8.10 per hour for non-tipped employees and $4.05 per hour for tipped employees will stay the same in 2016. A minimum wage of $7.25 will apply to smaller companies (yearly gross revenues of $297,00 and under) and to 14- and 15-year-olds.David W. Neel - Cleveland Employment Attorneyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07231905872240364058noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4023603741907179520.post-66235701923871262322015-09-27T12:18:00.000-04:002015-09-27T12:18:13.388-04:00Can Supervisors Enforce an Arbitration Agreement They Did Not Sign?<div style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in; text-align: justify;">
Plaintiff Rivera
worked for Rent a Center. He sued his supervisor, Owens, for race
discrimination. Owens presented an arbitration agreement between Rivera and
Rent a Center and asked the court to dismiss or stay the case pending
arbitration. The agreement provided arbitration of legal claims against
not only Rent a Center but also against its employees. Rivera insisted that the
agreement was between him and Rent a Center only.</div>
<br />
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt;">
The
Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision denying
Owen's Owens' motion. The reason? Pretty simple: Owens was a third-party
beneficiary of the agreement. In short, basic agency and contract principles
apply to arbitration agreements, including ones between employer and employee.
<i><a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9571312252544854890&hl=en&as_sdt=6&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr" target="_blank">Rivera v. Rent A Center, Inc.</a></i>, 2015-Ohio-3765 (8th Dist., Sept, 17,
2015).</div>
David W. Neel - Cleveland Employment Attorneyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07231905872240364058noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4023603741907179520.post-39165502816092475122015-09-27T11:48:00.000-04:002015-09-27T11:48:16.601-04:00Overtime and Minimum Wages Under Ohio Law<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-size: 12pt;">The Cuyahoga County
Court of Appeals recently issued a highly favorable opinion for employees
seeking overtime and minimum wage payments. In <a href="http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/8/2015/2015-Ohio-3769.pdf" target="_blank"><span style="color: blue;"><i>Porter v. AJ Automotive Group, Inc.</i></span></a>,
2015-Ohio-3769 (8th Dist., Sept. 17, 2015), plaintiffs claimed nonpayment of
minimum wages and overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA") and the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act
("OMFWSA"). The trial court decided that defendants were not "employers"
as defined under the FLSA and the OMFWSA because plaintiffs did not establish
that they met the $150,000 revenue threshold, but invoked its "equitable
powers" and awarded plaintiffs the difference between what defendants had
paid them and what they should have, and awarded plaintiff the difference. The
trial court, however, did not not award liquidated damages, attorney's fees and
costs which were otherwise available under the FLSA and the OMFWSA. Plaintiffs
appealed that portion of the decision.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-size: 12pt;">The court of appeals
reversed, explaining:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: .5in; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-size: 12pt;">{¶8}
According to the trial court's decision, it reasoned that the OMFWSA did not
apply because plaintiffs failed to establish that AJ Automotive
and Andrew Jackson met the definition of "employer" as contained in
R.C. 4111.03(D)(2), which provides in relevant part:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: .5in; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 1.0in; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-size: 12pt;">(2)
"Employer" means * * * any individual, partnership, association,
corporation, business trust, or any person or group of persons, acting in the
interest of any employer in relation to an employee, but does not include an
employer whose annual gross volume of sales made for business done is less than
one hundred fifty thousand dollars * * *.<br />
<br />
<!--[if !supportLineBreakNewLine]--><br />
<!--[endif]--><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: .5in; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-size: 12pt;">{¶9}
The trial court's reliance on this section to deny plaintiffs protection under
the OMFWSA was flawed for two reasons. First, this section applies to
"overtime" and does not relate to a claim for failure to pay minimum
wage, which is the bulk of Porter and White's claims. R.C. 4111.02, which
governs an employer's duty to pay minimum wage, expressly states that "[e]very
employer, as defined in Section 34a, Article II, Ohio Constitution, shall pay
each of the employer's employees at a wage rate of not less than the wage rate
specified in Section 34a of Article II, Ohio Constitution." The statute
does not contain a sales threshold within the definition of an employer.<br />
<br />
{¶10} Article II, Section 34a, Ohio Constitution sets forth that
"`employer' and `employee' shall have the same meanings as under the
federal Fair Labor Standards Act or its successor law * * *." Under the
federal FLSA, AJ Automotive and Andrew Jackson satisfy the broad definition of
"employer," which is defined as "any person acting directly or
indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee * *
*." 29 U.S.C. 203(d). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: .5in; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-size: 12pt;">The court further stated
that employers have the burden of proving their business' gross volume is
less than $150,000 (citing <a href="http://www.leagle.com/decision/198431320OhioApp3d293_1229/GRAHAM%20v.%20HARBOUR" target="_blank"><span style="color: blue;"><i>Graham v. Harbour</i></span></a>, 20
Ohio App.3d 293, 297, 486 N.E.2d 184 (10th Dist.1984).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-size: 12pt;">The lesson here is that
Ohio plaintiff's employment lawyers should plead overtime and minimum wage
claims under the OMFWSA as well as under the FLSA. Moreover, according to Judge
Robert McClelland of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, trial courts
have equitable authority to award minimum wages and overtime, even if the FLSA
and OMFWSA do not apply. Clearly a victory for plaintiffs. Kudos to plaintiffs'
lawyer, Alan Goodman, for his work on this case.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
David W. Neel - Cleveland Employment Attorneyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07231905872240364058noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4023603741907179520.post-52188147213846141512015-09-23T12:11:00.000-04:002015-09-23T12:11:16.959-04:00Halliburton Agrees to Pay $18,293,557 in Overtime WagesThe Department of Labor reports:<br />
<br />
In one of the largest recoveries of overtime wages in recent years for the U.S. Department of Labor, oil and gas service provider, Halliburton, has agreed to pay $18,293,557 to 1,016 employees nationwide. The department’s Wage and Hour Division investigated Halliburton as part of an ongoing, multi-year compliance initiative in the oil and gas industry in the Southwest and Northeast.<br />
<br />David W. Neel - Cleveland Employment Attorneyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07231905872240364058noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4023603741907179520.post-66834510765516830112015-09-14T17:05:00.002-04:002015-09-14T17:05:48.971-04:00Training American Workers For the Global EconomyThe U.S. Department of Labor announced today that it has awarded $13 million to Catholic Relief Services to train Honduran and El Salvadoran workers for the global economy. While I think that's a great idea, shouldn't that money be used train Americans to compete in the global economy? Just a quick thought.<a href="http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/ilab/ILAB20151800.htm" target="_blank">Labor Department Announcement</a><br />
<br />
<br />David W. Neel - Cleveland Employment Attorneyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07231905872240364058noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4023603741907179520.post-40567012395017165562015-08-13T17:13:00.001-04:002015-08-13T17:13:02.454-04:00WHD News Brief: US Department of Labor signs agreement with Alaska Department of Labor and Workforce Development to protect workers from misclassification [08/13/2015]<a href="http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/whd/WHD20151586.htm#.Vc0IUewMR1w.blogger">WHD News Brief: US Department of Labor signs agreement with Alaska Department of Labor and Workforce Development to protect workers from misclassification [08/13/2015]</a>David W. Neel - Cleveland Employment Attorneyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07231905872240364058noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4023603741907179520.post-26722083494416355052015-07-03T13:08:00.001-04:002015-07-03T13:08:46.037-04:00Overtime Pay for More Workers<div align="left" class="MsoNormal">
The Huffington
Post reports the Obama Administration is making good on its promise to bring
more employees under the protections of the Fair Labor Standards Act: <o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="left" class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div align="left" class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 0.5in;">
On
Monday, the White House unveiled a major reform that should guarantee overtime
coverage for salaried workers earning less than $50,440 per year. If the
proposal goes into effect in 2016 as planned, an estimated 5 million new
workers will be eligible for time-and-a-half pay, the standard overtime rate in
the U.S., whenever they work more than 40 hours a week.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="left" class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 0.5in;">
<br /></div>
<div align="left" class="MsoNormal">
Under current
law, professional, executive or administrative employees are exempt from
overtime law as long as they earn $455 per week. That comes out to $23,660 per
year. If the White House’s proposal becomes law then such employees making less
than $970 per week, or $50,440 per year, will be entitled to receive overtime
pay.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="left" class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<br />
<div align="left" class="MsoNormal">
<a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/07/03/tom-perez-overtime_n_7721398.html" target="_blank">Here is a link to the article.</a><span style="font-size: 13.5pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<br /></div>
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<br /></div>
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<br /></div>
David W. Neel - Cleveland Employment Attorneyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07231905872240364058noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4023603741907179520.post-20545528021924429362015-06-19T10:27:00.002-04:002015-06-19T10:27:46.603-04:00FedEx will pay $227M to settle suits alleging it misclassified its delivery drivers<a href="http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/fedex_settles_suits_over_misclassification_of_workers_for_227m/?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=weekly_email&utm_source=maestro&job_id=150617BD" target="_blank">From the ABA Journal</a>David W. Neel - Cleveland Employment Attorneyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07231905872240364058noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4023603741907179520.post-11663694218282343172015-05-14T09:53:00.000-04:002015-05-19T14:20:14.387-04:00Sixth Circuit Reverses Summary Judgment in Race Discrimination Case<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-size: 12pt; text-align: justify;"> The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit (which hears appeals from U.S. district courts in Michigan, Ohio,
Kentucky and Tennessee) issued a plaintiff-friendly opinion in a race
discrimination case on May 7, 2015.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-size: 12pt;"> In </span><a href="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/15a0084p-06.pdf" style="font-size: 12pt;" target="_blank">Wheat v. Fifth Third Bank, No.13-4199 (6th Cir., May 7, 2015)</a><span style="font-size: 12pt;">, the plaintiff, an African-American, initiated
a verbal confrontation with a Caucasian co-worker. Their discussion ended when
plaintiff went to his desk but the co-worker soon approached plaintiff and
reignited the argument. They went to a hallway, argued back and forth and,
according to plaintiff’s deposition testimony, the co-worker swatted his arm as
he turned to return to his desk. Plaintiff admitted calling his co-worker a “bitch”
numerous times. The co-worker admitted telling plaintiff that plaintiff did not know </span><span style="font-size: 12pt;">what the co-worker was capable of doing. A human resources representative met with
plaintiff first. Plaintiff was not entirely cooperative during the interview
but the record contained disputed facts and inferences as to what occurred. The
co-worker was then interviewed. He essentially said he thought the two simply
were having a bad day. Both employees were sent home but plaintiff was told not
to report to work until notified. The bank terminated plaintiff for violating
its workplace violence and anti-harassment policies, making a threat of
physical violence, violating the bank’s “core values.” The bank issued
discipline to the co-worker but did not terminate him. Plaintiff filed an
administrative charge with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission. Upon receiving the
charge the bank reopened its investigation and ultimately decided to terminate the
co-worker as well. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-size: 12.0pt;"> The value of this case to plaintiff’s
counsel is the court’s discussion of how summary judgment is supposed to work
in the familiar <i>McDonnell Douglas</i> indirect evidence discrimination case. Gratifying
in particular is the court’s citation to <i><a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10001115401901877954&hl=en&as_sdt=6&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr" target="_blank">Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods.,Inc.</a></i>, 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000), with respect to the third step of the<i> McDonnell
Douglas</i> concerning pretext. Quoting <i>Reeves </i>the court said:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: .5in; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-size: 12.0pt;">However, the burden on the defendant at this stage of
the McDonnell Douglas analysis is not to prove the existence of a
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Rather, as the
Supreme Court has instructed, “This burden is one of production, not
persuasion; it ‘can involve no credibility assessment.’” (Quoting <i><a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/92-602.ZS.html" target="_blank">St. Mary’sHonor Ctr. v. Hicks</a></i>, 509 U.S. 502, 509 (1993)).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: .5in; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-size: 12.0pt;">Our analysis of the pretextual nature of the proffered
justifications for Fifth Third’s employment decision again must be overlaid
with an understanding of the summary-judgment principles at play. In other
words, at this preliminary stage of the litigation, Wheat need only identify
genuine disputes of fact regarding the legitimacy of the defendant’s stated
reasons in order to withstand a motion for summary judgment. We conclude that
the plaintiff has met that burden.</span><span style="font-size: 12pt;"> </span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-size: 12.0pt;"> The Wheat case will be cited often
by discrimination plaintiffs in cases in this circuit. It is without question a
useful tool in overcoming summary judgment motions by employers and getting
cases to trial.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
David W. Neel - Cleveland Employment Attorneyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07231905872240364058noreply@blogger.com0