Friday, May 3, 2019
Admissibility of Co-Worker Statements in Employment Cases
For a simple explanation about using co-worker statements in the employment law setting, see my article at neellaw.com.
Prior Consistent Statements in Employment Cases
For a simple explanation about using prior consistent statements in the employment law setting, see my article at neellaw.com.
Tuesday, November 22, 2016
The Future of President Obama's Overtime Pay Reforms
Interesting article regarding what President-Elect Trump might do to gut President Obama's overtime pay reform efforts.
Wednesday, August 24, 2016
Ohio Makes It Easier To Obtain Public Records
The Columbus Dispatch reports that the Ohio General Assembly has passed legislation intended to streamline fights with government over public record requests. The law applies to all levels and types of government in Ohio. The article reports:
"On Sept. 28, the Ohio Court of Claims will begin accepting complaints on the refusal to release
records by government at all levels, from townships to the state. The law *** will send
complaints to a mediator who will work with citizens and government officials in an attempt to
reach a resolution. If no agreement is reached, a special master will rule within seven days whether government was
legally correct in denying a records request or broke the law and must hand over the records. *** The appeals process requires but a complaint form, a $25 filing fee and accompanying copies of
the records requests and government denials."
Public record requests area great way to gather information before suing a governmental entity. This new law should help make it easier to obtain such information.
Tuesday, August 23, 2016
Employer's Religious Rights Win Out Over Transgendering Employee's RIghts
Anthony Stephens began working as a Funeral director for R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes in 2007. Six years later Stephens gave the funeral home a letter stating:
"Dear Friends and Co-Workers:
"What I must tell you is very difficult for me and is taking all the courage I can muster. I am writing this both to inform you of a significant change in my life and to ask for your patience, understanding, and support, which I would treasure greatly. . ..I have a gender identity disorder that I have struggled with my entire life. I have managed to hide it very well all these years . . ..
"I have been in therapy for nearly four years now and have been diagnosed as a transsexual. I have decided to become the person that my mind already is. Toward that end, I intend to have sex reassignment surgery. The first step I must take is to live and work full-time as a woman for one year. At the end of my vacation on August 26, 2013, I will return to work as my true self, Amiee Australia Stephens, in appropriate business attire. . .. It is my wish that I can continue my work at R.G. & G. R. Harris Funeral Homes doing what I have always done, which is my best!"
"Dear Friends and Co-Workers:
"What I must tell you is very difficult for me and is taking all the courage I can muster. I am writing this both to inform you of a significant change in my life and to ask for your patience, understanding, and support, which I would treasure greatly. . ..I have a gender identity disorder that I have struggled with my entire life. I have managed to hide it very well all these years . . ..
"I have been in therapy for nearly four years now and have been diagnosed as a transsexual. I have decided to become the person that my mind already is. Toward that end, I intend to have sex reassignment surgery. The first step I must take is to live and work full-time as a woman for one year. At the end of my vacation on August 26, 2013, I will return to work as my true self, Amiee Australia Stephens, in appropriate business attire. . .. It is my wish that I can continue my work at R.G. & G. R. Harris Funeral Homes doing what I have always done, which is my best!"
There was no question that Stephens intended to abide by the funeral home’s dress code for female funeral directors. After receiving the letter the business owner, Thomas Rost, decided to fire Stephens. There was no dispute that Rost based his decision on sincerely held religious beliefs.
The legal issue was whether the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) trumped Stephens’ rights under Title VII, the federal anti-discrimination in employment law. Title VII prohibits employers from discharging or otherwise discriminating against any individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment “because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that sex discrimination may manifest itself in stereotypical notions as to how women and men should dress and present themselves in the workplace. It’s referred to as sex-stereotyping. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). The goal of the sex-stereotyping theory of sex discrimination is that “gender” “be irrelevant” with respect to the terms and conditions of employment and to employment decisions. Id.
The funeral home based its RFRA defense on the Supreme Court’s decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751 (2014). The majority in Hobby Lobby held:
“[L]aws [that are] ‘neutral’ toward religion,” Congress found, “may burden religious exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere with religious exercise.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(2); see also § 2000bb(a)(4). In order to ensure broad protection for religious liberty, RFRA provides that “Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability.” § 2000bb–1(a). If the Government substantially burdens a person’s exercise of religion, under the Act that person is entitled to an exemption from the rule unless the Government “demonstrates that application of the burden to the person—(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” § 2000bb–1(b)." Id. at 2761.
The district court applied the following analysis: (1) whether the law at issue substantially burdens the Funeral Home’s exercise of religion (Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct. at 2775); (2) if so, whether the Government can meet its burden of showing that application of the burden “to the person is (a) in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (b) the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct. at 2761.
Finding that Title VII substantially burdened the funeral home’s exercise of religion The court next assumed that the EEOC met its first burden of showing the anti-discrimination provisions in Title VII furthered a compelling governmental interest and, therefore, proceeded to the least restrictive means burden analysis. The court decided that the EEOC failed to satisfy this burden. The court’s analysis seems to hinge on a question it asked: “[C]ouldn’t the EEOC propose a gender-neutral dress code (dark-colored suit, consisting of a matching business jacket and pants, but without a neck tie) as a reasonable accommodation that would be a less restrictive means of furthering that goal under the facts presented here?” The funeral home’s owner, Mr. Rost, had testified in deposition that female funeral director’s could acceptably wear a business pants suit. Stephens agreed. To the court the issue was whether Stephens had a right to comply with the funeral home’s dress code (skirt and matching jacket) and decided she did not if she could be accommodated by being allowed to wear a business pants suit -- less restrictive means of enforcing Title VII.
Consequently, the court held that the funeral home was entitled to an RFRA exemption from Title VII. The EEOC has thirty days to appeal the decision to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. Given its straightforward and undisputed facts, this is an excellent case for the Supreme Court to revisit its decision in Hobby Lobby in order to provide guidance on what is a re-occurring issue.
The case is EEOC v. RG & GR Harris Funeral Home, Inc. (E.D. Mich., Aug. 19, 2016).
The legal issue was whether the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) trumped Stephens’ rights under Title VII, the federal anti-discrimination in employment law. Title VII prohibits employers from discharging or otherwise discriminating against any individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment “because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that sex discrimination may manifest itself in stereotypical notions as to how women and men should dress and present themselves in the workplace. It’s referred to as sex-stereotyping. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). The goal of the sex-stereotyping theory of sex discrimination is that “gender” “be irrelevant” with respect to the terms and conditions of employment and to employment decisions. Id.
The funeral home based its RFRA defense on the Supreme Court’s decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751 (2014). The majority in Hobby Lobby held:
“[L]aws [that are] ‘neutral’ toward religion,” Congress found, “may burden religious exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere with religious exercise.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(2); see also § 2000bb(a)(4). In order to ensure broad protection for religious liberty, RFRA provides that “Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability.” § 2000bb–1(a). If the Government substantially burdens a person’s exercise of religion, under the Act that person is entitled to an exemption from the rule unless the Government “demonstrates that application of the burden to the person—(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” § 2000bb–1(b)." Id. at 2761.
The district court applied the following analysis: (1) whether the law at issue substantially burdens the Funeral Home’s exercise of religion (Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct. at 2775); (2) if so, whether the Government can meet its burden of showing that application of the burden “to the person is (a) in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (b) the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct. at 2761.
Finding that Title VII substantially burdened the funeral home’s exercise of religion The court next assumed that the EEOC met its first burden of showing the anti-discrimination provisions in Title VII furthered a compelling governmental interest and, therefore, proceeded to the least restrictive means burden analysis. The court decided that the EEOC failed to satisfy this burden. The court’s analysis seems to hinge on a question it asked: “[C]ouldn’t the EEOC propose a gender-neutral dress code (dark-colored suit, consisting of a matching business jacket and pants, but without a neck tie) as a reasonable accommodation that would be a less restrictive means of furthering that goal under the facts presented here?” The funeral home’s owner, Mr. Rost, had testified in deposition that female funeral director’s could acceptably wear a business pants suit. Stephens agreed. To the court the issue was whether Stephens had a right to comply with the funeral home’s dress code (skirt and matching jacket) and decided she did not if she could be accommodated by being allowed to wear a business pants suit -- less restrictive means of enforcing Title VII.
Consequently, the court held that the funeral home was entitled to an RFRA exemption from Title VII. The EEOC has thirty days to appeal the decision to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. Given its straightforward and undisputed facts, this is an excellent case for the Supreme Court to revisit its decision in Hobby Lobby in order to provide guidance on what is a re-occurring issue.
The case is EEOC v. RG & GR Harris Funeral Home, Inc. (E.D. Mich., Aug. 19, 2016).
Monday, August 8, 2016
Court Decides LGBT Discrimination is Lawful
Kimberly Hively sued Ivy Tech Community College claiming she was not promoted because of her sexual orientation.
She based her claim on Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, arguing that employment discrimination against lesbians should be prohibited under Title VII.
Hively of course is correct -- such discrimination should be unlawful. Title VII, however, is limited to discrimination based on race, color, national origin, sex or religion. Predictably the federal Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decided that Hively's claim went "beyond the scope" of the statute. If Title VII is to apply to the LGBT community only Congress or the Supreme Court can make it happen.
Discrimination against gays, lesbians and others with different sexual make-ups should be illegal -- Hively was right about that. This won't happen without legislative action. Sad but true.
The case is Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College, No. 15-1720 (7th Cir. 2016).
Hively of course is correct -- such discrimination should be unlawful. Title VII, however, is limited to discrimination based on race, color, national origin, sex or religion. Predictably the federal Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decided that Hively's claim went "beyond the scope" of the statute. If Title VII is to apply to the LGBT community only Congress or the Supreme Court can make it happen.
The case is Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College, No. 15-1720 (7th Cir. 2016).
Wednesday, July 27, 2016
Police Shooting of a Non-Threatening Suspect Following A Car Chase Gives Rise to Viable Civil RIghts Case
Suing the police is a difficult endeavor because the qualified immunity doctrine shields government officials from liability for their exercise of discretion, unless their actions violate clearly established rights. Most civil rights cases against police officers fail for this reason. Moreover, after a trial court decides the qualified immunity question the case is immediately appealable. This means that years can go by before the plaintiff can even begin to engage in discovery on the merits, much less get a trial.
Sometimes though the evidence demonstrates a clear case under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, the applicable civil rights statute. For example, police officers who fire rounds into a suspect's vehicle when the chase ends but who have no reason to believe they are threatened are not going to be entitled to qualified immunity. That's what happened in Thompson v. City of Lebanon, Case No. 14-5711 (6th Cir., July 26, 2016). The police in that case killed the suspect.
Thompson's case merely survived a qualified immunity challenge. It took more than six years from the date of the incident to get a ruling from the court of appeals. The case now goes back to the trial court for further proceedings, assuming the defendants do not ask the U.S. Supreme Court to intervene. Justice delayed is justice denied. This case is prime example.
Sometimes though the evidence demonstrates a clear case under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, the applicable civil rights statute. For example, police officers who fire rounds into a suspect's vehicle when the chase ends but who have no reason to believe they are threatened are not going to be entitled to qualified immunity. That's what happened in Thompson v. City of Lebanon, Case No. 14-5711 (6th Cir., July 26, 2016). The police in that case killed the suspect.
Thompson's case merely survived a qualified immunity challenge. It took more than six years from the date of the incident to get a ruling from the court of appeals. The case now goes back to the trial court for further proceedings, assuming the defendants do not ask the U.S. Supreme Court to intervene. Justice delayed is justice denied. This case is prime example.
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