Arthur Roberts, Jr. was hired by the Alabama Department of Youth
Services (DYS) as a Security Officer. Within
his first few months of employment Roberts notified his supervisor and other
administrators that he was an ordained minister and that he wished to provide
volunteer pastoral services to the facility’s young men. DYS gave its approval
and scheduled him to begin providing services once a month on Sunday. McCree, Roberts’ immediate supervisor, ridiculed
him about his religious activity, teasing him with comments such as “preaching
the word today, Minister?” and “You going to get some saved today, ain’t you,
Preacher?” McCree also told Roberts not to “come out here with that preaching
shit to these kids” because “they don’t want to hear it, ” and McCree stated to
another employee, “How in the world is that man [Roberts] going to come out
here and preach, when he can’t perform his job he was hired to do[?]”. These comments
were made over several months. Roberts filed
a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and later sued
DYS and McCree for religious discrimination hostile work environment claim and for
retaliatory discharge.
The district court granted summary judgment on Roberts’ religious
discrimination claim. The court decided that McCree’s comments were insufficient
to establish objectively severe and pervasive conduct. In other words, they
were isolated, off-hand comments. Roberts’
claim was not aided by his testimony that he was still able to perform his job
duties.
However, the district court allowed Roberts’ retaliatory discharge
claim to go to trial. The central evidence in support of that claim was co-worker
testimony that McCree said he intended to “fire [Roberts’s] ass” if he had
filed an EEOC charge. Under University of Texas Southwestern Medical
Center v. Nassar, 133 S.Ct. 2517 (2013), a retaliation plaintiff must prove
that the retaliatory motive was the ‘but-for’ cause of the adverse employment
action. Thus, “proof that the unlawful retaliation would not have occurred in
the absence of the alleged wrongful action or actions of the employer” is
required. Nassar, 133 S.Ct. at 1533.
The district court borrowed an analogy from Burrage v. United States, 134 S.Ct. 881 (2014), to explain that but-for
causation can exist even when other possible motives are in the mix, such
Roberts’ lackluster job performance:
[R]etaliatory intent may still constitute a but-for
cause even if it “combines with other factors to produce the result, so long as
the other factors alone would not have done so--if, so to speak, it was the
straw that broke the camel’s back. Thus, if poison is administered to a man
debilitated by multiple diseases, it is a but-for cause of his death even if
those diseases played a part in his demise, so long as, without the incremental
effect of the poison, he would have lived.” Id. at 888.
So, even though Robert’s job performance may have contributed to the
termination decision, McCree’s comment that he intended to “fire [Roberts’s]
ass” if he filed an EEOC complaint raised a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether the EEOC charge was “the straw that broke the camel’s back.”